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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between micro-level innovation performance, changes in institutional 
frameworks and the mediating role of strategy embeddedness in the context of firms from emerging 
economies (known as latecomer firms). The paper is based on a multiple case-study design that draws on 
first-hand longitudinal evidence gathered during a three-year fieldwork campaign centered on 13 firms 
from the forestry, pulp and paper industries in Brazil (1950-2009). The results suggest that variability in 
the firms‟ innovation performance, proxied as capability levels, across changing institutional frameworks 
was mediated by degrees of strategy embeddedness. Specifically, the following applied to firms that 
pursued proactive strategy embeddedness: (i) their innovation performance was significantly higher over 
time than firms that pursued active and/or reactive strategy embeddedness; (ii) they faced whatever 
discontinuities with progressively higher levels of innovation performance than firms that pursued an 
active and/or reactive strategy embeddedness; (iii) they sought to shape their institutional frameworks to 
overcome hurdles inherent to their latecomer condition and negotiate their transitions into world-leading 
technological and commercial positions. Although macro- and meso-level institutional frameworks are 
necessary for industrial growth, innovation and competitiveness, these achievements largely depend on 
the nature and dynamics of firms‟ own strategic choices and related innovation efforts. Policymaking 
should therefore involve coordinated efforts between government and firms. Based on a novel theoretical 
framework and rich empirical assessment, this paper contributes to advancing our understanding of 
factors affecting the innovation performance of latecomer firms, especially in natural-resource processing 
industries.  
 
Key words: Catch-up; capability building; latecomer firms; natural resource-processing 
industries; Brazil.  
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1. Introduction  
During the mid-1970s a programme of studies led by Jorge Katz in Latin America gave rise to 
the research field of innovation capability building in firms from developing and emerging 
economies, known as latecomer firms as they (Bell, 2006): (i) emphasised the dynamics of the 
micro-level paths of capability accumulation; (ii) explored the role of learning mechanisms 
underlying those paths; and (iii) investigated the interactions of those capability building paths 
with the meso and macro-level institutional frameworks. After a period of absence of these kinds 
of studies, there has been, since the early-1990s, increasing research interest in producing 
explanations for the causes and consequences of the nature of capability-building paths taken by 
latecomer firms.  
 
By the early 1990s Sanjaya Lall (Lall, 1992) provided us with an explanatory framework centred 
on the development of firm-level technological capabilities. As he noted, by accumulating their 
innovation capabilities, latecomer firms could narrow the technological gaps between them and 
firms in the industrialised world, achieve industrial growth and even technological and market 
leadership. He emphasised that the primary driving force for this development was the 
investments undertaken by firms to accumulate their innovation capability.
1
  
 
Lall viewed such capability building efforts as a response to external and internal stimuli. This 
led him to distinguish between firm-specific factors, which affect micro-level differences in 
capability development, and factors that are common to countries and involve their policy 
regimes, skill endowments and incentives (p. 169). Although Lall recognised the importance of 
micro-level factors and industry-specific institutions to firms‟ innovation performance, he did 
not explore much of these variables.   
 
                                                          
1
 Such investments refer largely to the creation and building of innovation capabilities.  
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Subsequent to the development of Lall‟s (1992) framework, a new generation of studies began to 
advance explanations, from both intra- and inter-firm perspectives, about the role of learning 
processes in influencing innovation performance in latecomer firms (e.g., Hobday, 1995; Kim, 
1998; Dutrénit, 2000; Figueiredo, 2003; Marcelle, 2004; Dantas and Bell, 2009). However, our 
understanding of the role of factors, other than learning, on variability in terms of innovation 
performance across latecomer firms remains limited. This, in turn, constrains the quality of the 
recommendations generated by researchers to decision makers involved in actions on industrial 
innovation performance. Over the past few years, there have been efforts to explain how factors, 
other than learning, affect innovation performance in latecomer firms. However, these seem to 
have focused either on a narrow range of variables or to have been based on discrepant evidence, 
as briefly reviewed below.  
 
In relation to studies based on micro/meso-level designs, some explore the correlation between 
firm-specific factors, such as age, size, ownership, and market orientation as well as innovation 
capabilities (e.g. Wignaraja, 2002; Rasiah, 2006; Quadros and Consoni, 2009). However, the 
variability found across firms in terms of innovation performance is poorly explained. Other 
studies explore a combination of firm-level and industry-level factors and their implications for 
firms‟ innovative or catch-up performance (Lee and Lim, 2001; Park and Lee, 2006). However, 
they shed limited light on the accumulation of capabilities at the earlier stages. They cut across 
the East Asian catch-up story only after the shift from structures in which governments played 
the dominant role in funding and even performing R&D to one where firms played the dominant 
role.  
 
Another stream of work examines firms‟ performance in terms of „intra-national‟ and „global‟ 
catching-up (Jung and Lee, 2010; Iacovone and Crespi, 2010). However, their findings appear to 
be contradictory. Based on evidence from Korean and Japanese firms, Jung and Lee (2010) 
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suggest that sector-level variables only affect international TFP catch-up, whereas firm-level 
variables, among them „innovation capabilities‟, only determine intra-national catch-up. Based 
on evidence from Mexican firms, Iacavone and Crespi (2010) conclude that firms that make 
greater efforts to build their technological capabilities catch up much faster with the global 
frontier, while this effort does not really affect how fast they can catch up with the domestic 
frontier. The problem is that the design of these studies does not allow them to capture the role of 
other micro-level factors that may influence firms‟ innovative performance. Considering that 
innovation-capability building depends on deliberate efforts, these can be conditioned by the 
nature of the firm‟s innovation-related strategy (Scott-Kemmis and Chitravas, 2007).  
 
In terms of studies addressing latecomer firms‟ innovative performance from a macro-level 
perspective, since the early 2000s, following the decline of the Washington Consensus 
perspective, there has been a growing interest in understanding the role of institutions in 
influencing industrial innovation (e.g., Nelson and Sampat, 2001; Rodrik, 2004, 2006; Cimoli et 
al., 2009;  Lee and Mathews, 2010). As argued in Rodrik (2004), institutions have been 
supporting many successful stories leading to industrial development. However, as pointed out in 
Nelson (2008, p. 1), in relation to concrete empirical analysis, “there remains a significant gap 
between aspirations and achievements”. Such gaps are even wider in latecomer contexts, 
especially in terms of micro- and intra-industry standpoints.
2
 There are, however, notable 
exceptions – e.g., Evans‟s (1995) „public-private symbiosis‟ approach applied to the information 
technology (IT) industry in Brazil, India and Korea.
3
 Indeed, there is a need for empirical 
analysis of the relationship between changing institutional frameworks and micro-level 
innovation performance, especially in the latecomer natural resource-rich settings.   
                                                          
2
 Nearly 20 years ago R Nelson made a call for researchers to take the interaction between firms and environmental 
factors more seriously for progress to be made in research on industrial leadership (see Nelson, 1996).  
3
 Although industries and firms from contemporary latecomer economies are not addressed, Murmann (2003) 
develops a careful and insightful analysis of the role of institutions in explaining why Germany overtook Britain and 
the US in terms of technological leadership in the synthetic dye industry before World War I.  
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For instance, in the context of East Asia, where the bulk of our recent understanding about long-
term technological development has been generated, there is a consensus of the important role 
played by macro-level institutions in the successful industrial innovation in that region (e.g., 
Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). One striking feature of this technological development process is 
that the successful micro-level paths of innovation capability building, most of them related to 
assembled-product industries, researched in the 1990s (e.g., Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997; 
Mathews, 1999) and the 2000s (Mu and Lee, 2005; Choung et al., 2006) have evolved 
continually and smoothly across relatively stable and fairly continuous macro-level institutional 
frameworks. Even after the Asian crisis in 1997 several Korean industries were returning to their 
development mode based on technological innovation as a result of industrial policy measures 
and firms‟ innovative efforts (e.g., Woo and Sul, 2000).4 Consequently, these studies reveal little 
about the implications of discontinuous institutional frameworks for innovation performance in 
latecomer firms and industries.  
 
As opposed to East Asian contexts, Latin American natural-resource-rich countries have 
experienced disruptions in their institutional frameworks, with apparently different kinds of 
impacts on their industrial-capability building. Some studies argue that the structural reforms of 
the early 1990s, which replaced the import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) regime with new 
conditions based on open economy and global competition, imposed a discontinuity to capability 
accumulation, perhaps at a lower level of capability than that set by the preceding ISI regime. 
They argue that such reforms have pushed Latin American economies into a „low development 
trap‟, in which the growing relevance of natural resources industries in Argentina, Chile and 
Brazil is deemed as a „negative‟ consequence of that macro-level discontinuity and an obstacle to 
deepening innovative capabilities (e.g., Katz, 2000; Reinhardt & Peres, 2000; Ocampo, 2001; 
                                                          
4 Other studies have sought to tackle East Asian firms‟ transition into leading innovation (e.g., Amsden and 
Tschang, 2003; Hobday et al., 2004). However, these studies do not scrutinise qualitative discontinuities in firms‟ 
capability-building paths under discontinuous institutional environments.  
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Cimoli and Katz, 2003). It is evident that such reforms have caused serious disruptions to 
industries across Latin America. Considering that such studies were based on data that did not 
cover beyond the mid-1990s, during which time the bulk of those discontinuities occurred, it 
seems reasonable that their findings would lead to such conclusions. However, the same kind of 
argument has been held during the 2000s, as in Cimoli and Correa (2005), and more recently in 
Castaldi et al. (2009):  
“In terms of specialization patterns, following the trade reforms, many Latin American economies 
increased their share of production in (i) natural resources and natural resource processing industries 
(such as pulp and paper, iron and steel, vegetable oil, etc)…[…] The last couple of decades have 
been particularly disappointing. […] The end result is a widening dualism whereby an increasing 
share of the whole economy is composed of activities typically characterised by a low knowledge 
content and low opportunities for technological and organisational learning.” (pp. 64-5).  
 
This is a whimpering view of the industrial reality, which generates very little (if any) 
explanatory contribution.
5
 First, by addressing such issues from a macro-level perspective, based 
on highly aggregated secondary data, these studies ignore intra-industry and micro-level 
variability and nuances of innovation performance across changing institutional frameworks. 
Second, they do not develop more sophisticated analytical frameworks to capture the dynamics 
of the industrial innovation process over time. Third, there is a common view on the „Latin 
America experience‟, on the one hand, and on natural resources industries, on the other. The 
latter is reduced, without any effort of definition or distinction, to „low-tech‟ sectors with low 
knowledge intensity. However, hidden behind their average „low-medium tech‟ characteristics, 
such sectors include firms with considerable innovation capabilities and that undertake new-to-
market and new-to-world types of innovation (von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005; Smith, 2005).  
 
                                                          
5
 Such a view appears to revert to a „Prebischian‟ and „dependence theory‟ kind of approach. Just as there is in this 
argument an unconditional belief in the ISI regime, there is also, in an opposite research stream, a belief in the 
Washington Consensus-type of policy. Thus the research field is left with is a scarcity of comprehensive 
perspectives (Figueiredo, 2008).    
7 
 
In sum, nearly 20 years after Lall‟s framework, explanations about variability across latecomer 
firms in terms of innovation performance are still limited. The review undertaken above suggests 
that research should urgently be directed to the understanding of the interaction between firms‟ 
innovation performance and changes in their institutional environments, as well as the role of 
micro-level attributes in mediating that interaction. This is precisely the intention of this paper.  
 
The first type of attribute refers to the changing institutions at the meso and macro levels. Instead 
of considering the firm‟s institutional environment as „given‟, „background conditions‟ or a 
„source of evidence‟ for strategy formulation, this paper considers the manner in which certain 
components of the institutional environment interact with the firm‟s innovation efforts. The 
second type of attribute resides within the firm. The first is the firm‟s innovation performance, 
which, different from most innovation studies, is proxied herein based on progressively higher 
levels of innovation-capability building. The second refers to the firm‟s strategy. Different from 
most studies, this paper emphasises a contextual or embeddedness approach to strategy. 
Specifically, the paper explores the role of capability-building strategy embeddedness, hereafter 
referred to as strategy embeddedness, in mediating the relationship between the changing meso- 
and micro-level institutional frameworks and variability in firms‟ innovation performance over 
time. Strategy embeddedness is defined herein as the relationships between the firm‟s strategy-
making process, related to innovation capability-building, and its institutional framework over 
time. It is operationalised in terms of levels: pro-active, active and reactive. The paper explores 
the role of strategy embeddedness in mediating variability in firms‟ innovative performance and 
changing institutional frameworks.  
 
This set of relationships is examined based on first-hand longitudinal evidence from 13 firms of 
the forestry, pulp and paper industries in Brazil (1950-2009). The remainder of this paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the paper‟s analytical framework, while Sections 3 and 
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4 contains the empirical setting and research methods, respectively. Section 5 presents the 
empirical findings followed by discussions of findings in Section 6. Section 7 contains the 
paper‟s concluding discussions.  
 
2. Analytical Framework  
This section presents the framework used in this paper to analyse the relationship between 
micro-level innovation performance, institutional frameworks and the mediating role of strategy 
embeddedness (Sections 2.1 to 2.3) and the operationalisation of such constructs (Section 2.4).  
 
2.1  Innovation performance in latecomer firms  
In this paper, firms‟ innovation performance reflects the accumulation of progressively higher 
levels of innovation capabilities. Firms‟ capabilities involve a stock of resources consisting of 
two broad dimensions: „human resources‟ (e.g., skills, and knowledge bases) and 
„organisational‟ – e.g., different forms of internal and external arrangements (Lall, 1992; Bell 
and Pavitt, 1993; Kim, 1997, 1998; Dutrénit, 2000). Specifically, the manner and the speed at 
which firms‟ capability-building paths proceed over time determine the types and levels of 
innovative activities that they are able to undertake, that is, the firm‟s innovation performance. 
Such innovation performance reflects the extent to which latecomer firms‟ catch up with or even 
overtake global technological leaders.  
 
However, in latecomer parlance, the term „catch-up‟ tends to suggest a single pathway, with 
different firms distributed along it, and a clearly defined „frontier‟6. Specifically, the notion of a 
frontier tends to be associated with that of all firms following the same specific technological 
path (towards the same end-point) as that previously followed by global technological leaders
7
. 
In reality, the process of technological development of latecomers cannot be represented using 
                                                          
6
 Richard Nelson, 2008, personal communication. 
7
 Martin Bell, 2008, personal communication. 
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the analogy of a race along a fixed track because of the possibility of successful overtaking by 
latecomers moving in new directions, and the emergence of radical discontinuities that open up 
opportunities for them (Perez and Soete, 1988; Lee and Lim, 2001; Figueiredo, 2010).  
 
By such means, latecomer firms may accumulate capabilities by which they may pursue 
significantly new directions of innovation that depart from the trajectories previously mapped 
out by earlier innovators, thus opening up qualitatively different segments of the international 
innovation frontier
8
. Rather than deeming the technological frontier an end-point or even a 
moving target, this paper considers it a fluid area or horizon to be explored. Thus the notion of 
catch-up herein also encompasses so-called „overtaking‟. Latecomer firms can explore such 
fluidity to create new segments in the technological frontier (Lee and Lim, 2001; Figueiredo, 
2010) 
 
However, firms differ in the manner and speed at which they engage in efforts to create their 
capabilities (Dosi, 1988; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Pavitt, 1998), leading to differences in the kinds of 
innovative activities they undertake or their innovation performance (e.g., „new-to-the-firm‟ or 
„new-to-the-world). Such innovation performance in latecomer firms may provide the resources for 
corporate growth through diversification (Amsden and Hikino, 1994), thus contributing to meeting 
the current challenges of industrial diversification (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006), global 
competition and sustainability. 
 
2.2 Firms’ innovation performance and institutional frameworks  
This section begins by clarifying the meaning of „institutions‟. Over the past two decades, there 
have been remarkable contributions from economics (North, 1990; Rodrik, 2004, 2006), 
institutional theory in sociology and organisation theory (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2001) 
                                                          
8
 Martin Bell, 2008, personal communication. 
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and innovation studies (Nelson and Sampat, 2001) on the role of institutions with respect to the   
innovative and competitive performance of firms and industries. Such a view has also been held in 
the research body about innovation capabilities in latecomer firms (e.g., Bell, et al., 1982; Lall, 
1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1993).  
 
According to North (1990) institutions „consist of both informal constraints and formal rules‟. 
Nelson and Sampat‟s (2001) notion of „social technology‟ is in line with North‟s (1990) „rules of 
the game‟ or „institutional arrangements‟. Although, by definition, „institutions‟ denote stability, 
they are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous (Scott, 2001). 
Institutional frameworks can be addressed from different perspectives such as broad policy 
regimes (e.g., North, 1990; Lall, 1992; Rodrik, 2004, 2006; Cimoli et al., 2009), industry-level 
frameworks (Murmann, 2003), public-private relationships (Evans, 1995) and knowledge related 
institutes and organisations (e.g., Malerba and Mani, 2009; Lundval et al., 2009). 
 
Building on these concepts and on insights from previous empirical research (e.g., Murmann, 
2003; Evans, 1995) this paper defines „institutional frameworks‟ as a set of norms in the form of 
laws, policies regulations, and incentive systems and knowledge-related bodies that shape and are 
shaped by firms‟ innovation-related strategic choices. Differently from North‟s (1990) view of 
firms as „players in the game‟ but in line with Murmann (2003), this paper considers that firms and 
industries can also shape institutional frameworks as they pursue leading innovative performance. 
Following Scott (2001) this paper views institutional frameworks as dynamic (Scott, 2001). In 
addition, firms differ in the manner in which they respond to industrial policy and government 
expectations (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) with different consequences for their technological 
behaviour (Bell et al., 1982) and competitive performance (Gulati, 1998).  
 
11 
 
2.3 Strategy embeddedness: mediating the interaction between firms’ innovative 
performance and institutional frameworks  
Influential approaches to firms‟ competitive performance – e.g., the „Chandlerian view‟, the 
„transaction cost view‟, the „industry-view‟ and the „resource-based view‟ – examine firms from 
an acontextual angle and consider „institutional frameworks‟ to be „background conditions‟ 
(Peng, 2002; Murmann, 2003; Peng et al., 2008).  
 
These „atomist-type‟ of approaches have generated many relevant contributions, but they provide 
only partial explanations about firms‟ competitive performance (Baum and Button, 1996). It is 
well known, but not always operationalised in existing studies, that managers do not react or 
adapt automatically to intractable contingencies imposed by the environment. They can 
proactively make „strategic choices‟ about what will be relevant, what will be constraints and 
pursue their course of actions (Child, 1972; Astley, 1984; Baum and Button, 1997). Such a view 
is recognised in works addressing technology and innovation strategy (e.g., Goodman and 
Lawless, 1994; Dodgson et al., 2008). As noted by Granovetter (1985) firms do not behave or 
decide as atoms outside of a social context, but their attempts at purposive action are instead 
embedded in concrete ongoing systems.  
 
Since the 1980s, and especially from the 1990s, there has been a growing awareness of the 
importance of an institutional embeddednesss approach to firm strategy (Baum and Dutton, 
1996; Hoskinsson et al, 2000). This view is in line with Peng‟s (2002) „institution-based view of 
business strategy‟ and the notion of embeddedness as a part of firms‟ strategic asset-seeking 
efforts (Dacin et al., 1999; Meyer et al., 2011). Indeed, firms rarely work alone in the process of 
building their strategic assets but rather in interaction with other actors of the environment in 
which they operate (Gulati, 1998). In their pursuit of knowledge to achieve distinguished 
competitive performance, firms become embedded in a variety of interactions with different actors 
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in their environment (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Such embeddedness denotes the notion that the 
achievement of firms‟ competitive performance can be facilitated by the attachments they create 
with several actors in their environment (Granovetter, 1985). As suggested in Nelson and Sampat 
(2001), such embeddedness may help firms to understand better the intricacies of their institutional 
frameworks. It may also help firms to cross discontinuities in their institutional frameworks.  
 
These approaches need to be tempered by the intricacies of the process of innovation-related 
strategies within firms. As noted in Pavitt (1990), technology and innovation strategies involve 
many organisational areas, different types of expertise, battles, political debate and advocacy 
within the firm. They emerge out of long trial-and-error processes (Pascale, 1984) and responses 
to crises (Mintzberg, 1994) and can be constrained by the firm‟s core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 
1995), resulting in truncated innovation performance (Druténit, 2000). They can also be 
persistently pursued the firm‟s entrepreneurs (Teece, 2007), the firm‟s dominant group (Kim, 
1997), as they can be stimulated or constrained by the leadership‟s behaviour (Figueiredo, 2001).  
 
To examine the role of the firm‟s strategy in mediating the interaction between changes in the 
firm‟s institutional frameworks and its innovation performance, this paper focuses on the 
capability-building strategy embeddedness of firms, or strategy embeddedness. Strategy 
embeddedness is defined herein as the relationships between the firm‟s strategy-making process, 
related to innovation capability building, and its institutional framework over time. This paper 
examines the relationship between these issues in a set of forestry and pulp and paper firms in 
Brazil over the period 1950-2009 by asking: 
(1) To what extent did these firms differ in terms of the manner and speed at which they 
achieved innovation performance across changing institutional frameworks during the 
1950-2009 period?  
13 
 
 (2) What was the role of strategy embeddedness in mediating the interaction between the 
changing institutional frameworks and innovation performance of these firms across that 
period?   
 
The relationship between the issues addressed in the research question constitutes the analytical 
framework underpinning this paper, as represented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  The paper’s analytical framework  
 
 
2.4 Operationalising the constructs  
2.4.1 Firms’ innovation performance  
There are different proxies to examine firms‟ innovative performance such as the introduction of 
inventions into the market (Freeman and Soete, 1997) or R&D intensity and expenditures and 
patent counts/citations (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). However, these indicators capture only a 
fraction of the innovative activities in latecomer firms (Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Bell, 
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2006), especially for pulp and paper industries (Laestadius, 1998). This paper adopts a nuanced 
view of innovation that involves increasing degrees of novelty and complexity in terms of 
processes, products and organisation, in line with the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005).  
 
Consequently, this paper draws on a modified version of the Lall/Bell and Pavitt typology (Lall, 
1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Figueiredo, 2001): it identifies „levels‟ of innovative capabilities 
ranging from „basic‟ to „world leading‟, consistent with the Oslo Manual. Such a typology has 
been used successfully in empirical studies, with slight variations in terminology (e.g., 
Figueiredo, 2003, 2010; Ariffin and Figueiredo, 2004; Hobday et al., 2004; Tsekouras, 2006; 
Iammarino et al., 2008; Dantas and Bell, 2009). Rather than identify capabilities in terms of 
specific resources, they have identified levels of innovative activity and then inferred that 
different levels of capability lie behind the patterns of innovation performance. Table 1 contains 
a condensed version of that framework. The first column shows four levels of innovative 
performance, ranging from „basic‟ to „world leading‟; the second column provides some 
illustrative examples of these levels of capability.
9
 
 
Although this framework emphasises capabilities that are internal to the firm, it also recognises 
that a substantial part of a firm‟s innovation capability lies in other organisations (e.g., research 
institutes, universities). Consequently, the building of innovation capability is not necessarily 
confined to firm boundaries, but may involve several interdependencies. For the firm to develop 
such interactions, it has to build up substantial in-house expertise (Mowery, 1983) or absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and demand for local R&D outputs (Bell and Pavitt, 
1993).    
 
                                                          
9 The original framework applied during fieldwork and analysis involved three individually tailored matrixes for 
forestry, pulp and paper. The application of this framework in this study was achieved after approximately six months 
of work, and involved several consultations with experts in forestry and pulp and paper industries for validation.  
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Table 1.  Typology to assess firms’ innovation performance 
 (condensed version) 
Levels of 
innovative 
performance  
Illustrative examples of these levels of innovation performance 
World leading  
(frontier pushing) 
 
 
Undertaking cutting-edge innovation that provides the firm with a world-leading technological and 
market position in forestry, pulp or paper (e.g., R&D for the introduction of new-to-the-world 
forestry development processes along new technological trajectories based on R&D in genomics 
and proteomics; playing leading roles in world-leading research networks; development of new 
production processes based on R&D and engineering; intellectual property system).  
Advanced 
 
Closing in on global leaders in terms of introducing innovations based on fast-follower kind of 
strategy thus achieving a competitive position in local and export markets, but not as leader (e.g., 
R&D projects for the introduction of new feedstock processes implemented by innovation leaders; 
forest management based on sophisticated international certification (e.g. FSC);R&D for the 
introduction of new production processes following leaders) 
Intermediate 
 
Implementation of relatively complex modifications to forestry techniques and to pulp and paper 
making processes and products. These permit the firm to achieve and sustain a competitive 
performance within the local national or niche markets (e.g. development of resources for forest 
installation, attendance and recovering and alternative processes and resources for disease and pests 
control; engineering efforts to adapt and improve production processes and equipment systems;  
Basic 
 
Implementation of basic levels of innovations which are novel to the firm and allow the firm to 
sustain a competitive performance in a regional market (e.g. implementation of resources for forest 
and agricultural installation, attendance and recovering; quality tests and features evaluation for 
seed and seedling production).  
 
2.4.2 Firms’ strategy embeddedness   
In line with previous research (Dacin et al., 1999; Figueiredo, 2011) this paper considers that 
firms‟ levels of strategy embeddedness, as part of firms‟ strategic-asset building efforts, vary. 
Thus, building on Goodman and Lawless (1994) and Scott-Kemmis and Chitravas, (2007) 
strategy embeddedness is herein operationalised in terms of three levels: pro-active, active and 
reactive (Table 2). Additionally, the typology identifies macro- and meso levels institutional 
frameworks. The latter is opened up in two sub-levels. The second component of the meso-level 
institutional framework (knowledge-related institutes) is equivalent to what is examined in 
Malerba and Mani (2009) and Lundval et al. (2009) and will be addressed here only very 
superficially.  
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Table 2. Typology for assessing strategy embeddedness 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
 a
n
d
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la
y
er
s 
 
o
f 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 
fr
am
ew
o
rk
s 
 
Macro-level  
Complex macro regimes of interconnected segments of implemented public policy 
within which firms operate: a set of laws, policies, incentives and industrial 
development policies, plans and programmes at the national level. 
 
 
Meso-level  
Sector-level policies, plans and incentives that underpin particular kinds of policy 
regime. Sector-level organisational structures and pressure groups (e.g. industry 
associations) acting to influence government policy. Aspects of political and 
bureaucratic public-private interactions related to specific industrial sectors 
underpinning particular kind of policy regime.  
Knowledge-related institutes and organisations surrounding latecomer firms and 
concerned with education, training, standards, research, and so forth. 
 
L
ev
el
s 
o
f 
st
ra
te
g
y
 e
m
b
ed
d
en
es
s 
 
Pro-active 
Very high awareness of the role of innovation capability in the firm‟s competitive 
performance. Pioneer and ambitious engagement in innovation activities. Initiative to 
provoke and interact with components of the meso- and macro level institutional 
frameworks.  Firms tend to pursue and hold a position of innovation „leaders‟.  
 
Active 
High awareness of the role of innovation capability in the firm‟s competitive 
performance. Relatively conservative and/or follower approach to engagement in 
innovation activities. Follower approach to interacting with meso- and macro level 
components of the institutional frameworks. Firms tend to pursue and hold a position 
of innovation „followers‟. 
 
Reactive 
 
Low or absent awareness of the role of innovation capability in the firm‟s competitive 
performance. Arm‟s length and/or indifferent to interactions with components of the 
meso- and macro level institutional frameworks.   Firms tend to hold a position of very 
slow innovation followers or laggards 
 
Firms‟ innovation performance levels 
 
3. Brazil’s Eucalyptus forestry and pulp and paper: a leading competitive position  
The pulp and paper industries are highly intensive in capital, processes and scale (Pavitt, 1984), 
while forestry itself is also increasingly science-based. The paper-making process involves the 
conversion of wood chips into pulp, which is processed to create paper. Pulp, the main raw 
material for papermaking, is obtained from trees such as pine (long-fibre or softwood) or 
eucalyptus (short-fibre or hardwood).  
 
Planted forests are renewable resources for diverse industries based on raw materials from fibres 
and lignocelluloses, especially the pulp and paper industries. As explained in Assis (2001),  
Grattapaglia (2004) and Grattapaglia and Kirst (2008), since the early 1990s, it has been realised 
that trees that yield more cellulose generate gains across the entire production chain in the form 
of savings from tree harvesting and transportation thus minimising the expansion of forests and 
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reducing effluent waste. Consequently, by realising that the „pulp factory‟ is the tree 
(Grattapaglia and Kirst, 2008), pulp and paper firms have shifted the focus of their efforts from 
volume growth to wood quality. The objective is to reduce the amount of wood in cubic meters 
necessary to produce one ton of pulp, i.e., to decrease the wood-specific consumption (WSC) 
(Grattapaglia and Kirst, 2008). During the 1980s, first-generation clonal forestry of eucalyptus 
reduced WSC by 20%. A further 20% reduction was achieved subsequently, based on second-
generation clones derived from eucalyptus hybridisation (Ikemori et al., 2005 and Assis et al., 
2005 apud Grattapaglia and Kirst , 2008)  
 
Historically, the world‟s main producers and innovators in the forestry, pulp and paper industries 
were the Norscan countries (Canada, US and Nordic countries Sweden, Finland and Norway). 
However, between the 1960s and 1970s, a major breakthrough in eucalyptus-based forestry 
technology was achieved, especially in Brazil.
10
 This led to the planting of the first large-scale 
commercial stands of selected clones derived from hardwood cuttings. These and subsequent 
advances resulted in exceptional genetic gains for growth and adaptability to tropical conditions 
and wood with higher pulp yield (Grattapaglia and Kirst, 2008). This technological development 
contributed to the achievement by Brazil of an internationally leading position in that field (see 
Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 For details of that breakthrough innovation see Figueiredo (2010). For technical details see Grattapaglia and Kirst 
(2008).  
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Table 3. Some indicators reflecting Brazil’s leading performance in forestry for pulp and 
paper 
 Brazil Chile Indonesia Canada Sweden Finland 
Rotation of trees (hardwood: short 
fibre) – number of years 
7 
(eucalyptus) 
10-12 
(eucalyptus) 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
35-40 
(birch) 
Rotation of trees (softwood – long 
fibre species) 
15 
(pinus spp) 
25 
(pinus 
radiate) 
 
n.a. 
45 (a) 
(oregon 
pinus) 
70-80 
(picea abies) 
Productivity of short fibre species  
– hardwood (m3/hectare per year) 
41 
(eucalyptus) 
25 
(eucalyptus) 
20 
(acacia) 
n.a. 6 
(birch) 
 
4 
(birch) 
 
Productivity in long-fibre  species 
– softwood (m3/hectare/year) 
35 
(pinus spp) 
22 
(pinus 
radiate) 
n.a. 7(b) 
(oregon 
pinus) 
4 
(picea abies) 
Proportion of planted forest in the 
country‟s territory  (percent) 
 
0.6 
 
2.9 
 
4.4 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Forest area needed to produce one 
million tonnes of pulp/year 
100,000 ha n.a n.a. n.a. 720,000 ha. 
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of data from FAO/Bracelpa (2008). Note: (a) and (b) = Coastal area. 
 
The technological advance achieved by Brazilian firms was reflected in the commercial 
performance (or market catch-up, Lee and Lim, 2001) achieved by Brazil. Table 4 shows that 
from 1970 to 2009, Brazil‟s exports of pulp and paper increased, respectively, by 14.2% and 
22.3% annually on average, while the average growth rates of Norscan countries were 0.18% 
(pulp) and 2.1% (paper) during that period. Brazil also achieved a superior export growth rate of 
pulp and paper exports in relation to other developing economies. Furthermore, from 2001 to 
2009, the export value of Brazil‟s pulp and paper exports grew, respectively, 10.7% and 23.8% 
annually on average, whereas the annual growth rates of Norscan countries were 0.18% (pulp) 
and 2.1% (paper) during that period.
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 See http://faostat.fao.org 
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Table 4. Evolution of pulp/paper exports: Norscan countries vs. Brazil and other developing economies (000 tonnes) 
(a)    Period related to 1968-70; (b) Period related to 1990-2009 
 
PAPER 
  
1970 
Growth rate 
(1961-70) 
1980 
Growth rate 
(1971-80) 
1990 
 Growth rate 
(1981-90) 
2000 
Growth rate 
(1991-2000) 
2009 
 Growth rate 
(2001-2009) 
Growth rate  
(1970-2009) 
 
Canada 8,073 3.6 9,555 2.2 11,874 2.4 15,613 3.0 9,526 − 4.5 0.4 
Finland 3,559 6.8 4,867 3.3 7,633 5.0 11,642 5.0 9,690 − 1.3 2.6 
Norway 1,018 7.9 1,048 0.9 1,476 4.2 1,981 3.4 1,296 − 4.9 0.6 
Sweden 2,939 8.7 4,626 5.1 6,613 3.8 9,031 3.9 9,867 1.8 3.2 
USA 2,424 10.9 4,186 5.0 5,388 4.6 9,139 4.1 11,277 3.4 4.0 
            
 
Brazil 1  39.0 
(c) 198 59.9 840 10.7 585 − 6.2 2,591 16.0 22.3 
Chile 96 12.4 87 1.01 131 8.0 313 10.7 586 6.0 4.7 
China 122 8.9 193 4.0 1,364 22.7 3,686 7.4 4,850 4.8 9.9 
Indonesia 0  0 7 0  166 39.9 2.717 25.1 3,574 4.9 24 
(d) 
Source: FAOSTAT, http://faostat.fao.org/ 
(c ) Related to period 1962-70;  (d) Period related to 1980- 2009 
PULP 
  
1970 
Growth rate 
(1961-70) 
1980 
 Growth rate 
(1971-80) 
1990 
 Growth rate 
(1981-90) 
2000 
Growth rate 
(1991-2000) 
2009 
Growth rate 
(2001-2009) 
Growth rate 
(1970-2009) 
 
Canada 4,762 40.9 7,009 4.2 7,652 1.8 11,652 3.5 6,757 − 5.3 0.9 
Finland 1,805 30.9 1,7612 3.6 1,363 − 1.2 1,681 2.8 1,456 − 1.7 − 0.5 
Norway 912 7.5 406 − 6.0 479 1.5 408 − 0.9 387 − 2.8 − 2.2 
Sweden 3,488 26.7 2,97 − 0.4 2,767 − 0.2 2,974 0.8 3,124 0.8 − 0.3 
USA 2,062 103.1 2,828 9.1 4,783 6.4 5,583 0.9 6,496 1.8 3.0 
                        
Brazil 39 66.5 890 44.4 1,035 0.9 2,917 8.7 7,056 8.9 14.2 
Chile 105 −5.61 (a) 415 16 581 6.8 1,835 12.3 4,061 7.2 9.8 
China 42 26.6 45 − 3.7 101 8.8 47 5.2 99 11.3 2.2 
Indonesia 0 0  0  0 130  0 1,352 29.9 2,621 4.94 17.1 (b) 
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In 2009, Brazil ranked as the world‟s fourth-largest pulp producer (all types), first as a producer 
of hardwood pulp („eucapulp‟), and ninth-largest paper producer. One hundred percent of all 
pulp and paper produced in Brazil is derived from planted forests. Although the pulp and paper 
industries in Brazil consist of 222 firms, about 88% of the total output derives from about 10 
large firms. From 2001 to 2005, the average share of the pulp and paper industries in Brazil‟s 
manufacturing value added (MVA) was 3.9%. Thus, over the past decades, Brazil has been 
holding a stronger leading market position in these industries, largely due to the innovation 
performance achieved by leading firms (Section 5).  
 
4. Methods 
4.1 Research design and cases selection 
This paper derives from an empirical study based on a three-year fieldwork campaign (2006-08 
with a follow-up in 2009) involving exploratory, pilot, and main fieldwork phases. In line with the 
research questions and considering that they required an in-depth study with an analytical 
generalisation, this study was designed using long-term and first-hand evidence from multiple 
cases. The adoption of such a design permitted a more detailed investigation of the research 
questions than that afforded by other methods (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) 
 
The cases to be studied were selected using the following criteria: (i) the firms account for nearly 
85% of the pulp and paper output in Brazil; (ii) they are large exporters and domestic market 
suppliers; (iii) some of them are top players in the world market; and (iv) they illustrate different 
levels of innovative performance with varied strategies and diverse interactions with institutional 
frameworks. This process led to selection of 13 firms and their particular business lines: forestry, 
pulp and paper (Table 5). This number permitted the research implementation without amassing 
an unmanageable volume of information (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
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Table 5. The selected cases 
 
 
Thirteen 
selected firms 
 
 
Start-up year 
 
Ownership 
 
Cases 
Forestry 
[7] 
Pulp 
[9] 
Paper 
[11] 
1. Alpha 1978 Brazilian   None 
2. Beta 1975 Foreigner   None 
3.Gama 1960 (1990) (a)  Foreigner None   
4. Delta 1945 Brazilian    
5. Epsilon 1950 (1990) (b) Brazilian None None  
6. Zeta-A 1954 (1990) (c) Brazilian    
7. Zeta-B 1985 Brazilian None None  
8. Theta 1974 Foreigner    
9. Iota 1978 Brazilian None None  
10. Kappa 1941 Brazilian    
11. Lambda 1966 Brazilian None None  
12. Sigma-A 1988 Brazilian    
13. Sigma-B (d) 1988 Brazilian None   
Notes: (a)-(c): Their coverage in this study is from 1990;  (d) Sigma-B does have forestry operations, but this business line 
is not covered in this study. 
 
4.2 Evidence gathering and analysis processes  
Following Jick (1979), Eisenhardt (1989), and Yin (2003), this study drew on a triangulation 
methodology to achieve robust internal validity and reliability. It was based on a combination of 
extensive fieldwork and follow-up questionnaires. During the pilot and main fieldwork, the 
evidence collection involved 155 formal and 44 informal interviews (from one to three hours in 
length), direct observations, and several consultations of firms‟ and industry associations‟ 
archival records. Twelve interviews were conducted with local universities, research institutes, 
industry associations and government bodies to verify the nature of their relationships with the 
case firms.  
 
The information-gathering process began by contacting the chief executive of each firm to 
clarify the purpose of this research and to negotiate access to evidence. With their approval it 
was possible to tap into various sources of information (e.g., industrial directors, managers, 
engineers, researchers, technicians, consultants, human resources and engineering departments, 
R&D units, labs, retired staff and archival records). Open-ended interviews were conducted 
using an interview guide that was constructed in light of the study‟s typologies. Double and 
triple checks of specific events were made via e-mail and/or phone calls. The extensive use of 
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triangulation made it possible to gather evidence from a range of different sources to substantiate 
the results of the analysis. 
 
Because the study sought to examine historical changes in the capability accumulation of the 
firms, special efforts were made to collect sufficient evidence to substantiate the reconstruction 
of the technological pathways taken by each firm. This was undertaken by scrutinising the firms‟ 
technological milestones, provided by different interviewees (including retired staff), internal 
presentations and records, annual reports and independent news reports. Even so, it is difficult to 
obtain a complete accuracy regarding past events. This is one of the limitations of this study. 
Nevertheless, the extensive use of triangulation allowed for gathering evidence from a range of 
different sources to substantiate the study.  
 
After the main fieldwork, follow-up questionnaires were sent to target informants. Because most 
of them were aware of the study, a 95% response rate was achieved. The application of the 
questionnaire sought to expand the findings, and particularly, to systematise and code evidence 
of the issues examined herein over the period covered by the study. The questionnaire, in the 
form of a matrix, derived from the frameworks in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
During the fieldwork, the researcher built up some associations between the firms‟ innovative 
activities and the ways in which they pursued their strategy embeddedness to improve their 
innovation performance across different institutional frameworks. Formal analyses involved the 
following techniques: (i) harmonisation and combination of the evidence from the interviews and 
observations with those from the follow-up questionnaires; (ii) tabulation of the frequency and 
types of observations over time and building systematic and successive „cross-company display 
tables‟ based on a „data reduction‟ procedure (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This was essential to 
reduce the sheer volume of information into a manageable size and to track main stages in the 
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study‟s constructs in a coherent manner; and (iii) systematic matching of different pieces of 
evidence from the cases with the study‟s analytical frameworks (and Tables 1 and 2) to achieve 
solid construct validity (Campbell, 1975).  
 
Additionally, rather than reducing all qualitative data to quantitative observations, both types of 
evidence were used to form the study‟s dataset, to run some statistical tests and to enrich the 
empirical analysis. For instance, qualitative evidence from the application of the innovation 
performance typology (Table 1) was transformed into quantitative observations to allow the speed 
of capability accumulation to be calculated. The capability levels accumulated for these activities 
by each firm were then aggregated into a single index to represent the overall capability level of 
each firm in the three business lines (forestry, pulp and paper) over time. Evidence of the types of 
strategy embeddedness of firms (Table 2) was coded to test its association with innovation 
performance over time. Finally, the qualitative evidence described in Section 5.2, in the form of 
narratives, contributes to both strengthening the arguments and establishing causal relationships 
(Dougherty, 2002).  
 
5. Empirical Findings  
Section 5.1 provides a brief overview of the association between the case firms‟ innovation 
performance and their strategy embeddedness across changing institutional frameworks (1950-
2009). Based on qualitative evidence, Section 5.2 examines the evolution of that relationship 
during that period. The presentation of the evidence is organised mainly around three periods: (i) 
the ISI policy regime (1950-1960s and 1970-1980s); (ii) the transition into an open economy 
regime (1990s); and (iii) the open economy and globalised competition regime (2000s).
12
  
 
                                                          
12 Considering that the 1990s involved changes that were deep and far reaching in the Brazil‟s economy and 
industry, their implementation and assimilation by the industry took several years. As a result, the whole decade can 
be deemed as a transition from ISI regime into a regime based on open economy and globalised competition.  
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5.1 Firms’ innovation performance and strategy embeddedness across different 
institutional frameworks: an overview  
The findings indicate that since the 1950s leading firms from the forestry, pulp and paper 
industries in Brazil have engaged in a kind of „path-creating‟ capability accumulation. They 
began to diverge from the existing technological trajectory at an early stage of the development 
of their innovation capabilities. Just after World War II, these firms began to make pulp and 
paper from eucalyptus trees, and to engage in activities that firms in the Norscan countries were 
not engaged in. This meant that relatively early on, they could not simply copy the recognised 
global leaders but were instead forced to develop technologies more suited to their own 
somewhat different operations. They could not simply imitate because they were developing 
along a different trajectory. This involved the use of different raw materials (eucapulp), and to 
develop an effective means to do this, they had to innovate in their downstream pulp and 
papermaking processes because of the innovations developed in the upstream forestry.  
Specifically, the firms took a different direction of technological development from those already 
pursued by the global industry leaders. By so doing, they opened up a qualitatively different 
segment at the international technological frontier. This pathway contrasts with the majority of 
case studies reported in the literature: it involved a qualitative discontinuity from the established 
technological trajectory at an early stage in the development of their capabilities (see Figure 2).
13
  
As illustrated in Figure 2, from the mid-2000s those firms that had achieved world-leading 
innovation performance, especially in the forestry area, began to draw on their accumulated 
capabilities to diversify into different business lines.  
 
 
                                                          
13 For details about these paths see Figueiredo (2010).  
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Figure 2. Evolution of the eucalyptus-based technological trajectory pursued by Brazil’s leading firms and some main related events 
26 
 
However, the process of innovation-capability building of these firms along the new 
technological segment was characterised by a high degree of variability in terms of the levels and 
speeds of capability accumulation (Table 6 and Figures 3 to 5).  
 
 Table 6. Innovation performance of the case firms (2009) 
Levels of innovation 
performance 
Firms, business lines and the number of years taken  
to attain each innovative performance level 
Forestry Pulp Paper 
 
World leading  
 
 
 
Sigma-A 23 Sigma-B 11 Sigma-B 18 
Alpha 31 Sigma-A 14 Sigma-A 19 
Delta 48 Alpha 22 Delta 54 
Theta 48 Delta 50 Kappa 54 
Kappa 51 Kappa 53  
 
 
Advanced  
 
 
Beta 
 
39 
Gamma 14 Theta 33 
Beta 26 Gamma 14 
 Zeta-B 18 
Intermediate  
 
 
Zeta-A 
 
11 
Zeta-A 11 Zeta-A 19 
Theta 31 Epsilon 14 
  Iota 22 
Lambda 37 
Source: Derived from the empirical study. 
 
 
    Figure 3. Evolution of firms in terms of capability accumulation along the eucalyptus-based 
trajectory: forestry 
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Figure 4. Evolution of firms in terms of capability accumulation along the eucalyptus-based 
trajectory: pulp 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of firms in terms of capability accumulation along the eucalyptus-based 
trajectory: paper 
 
In addition to these differences in innovation performance, the study also found differences 
across these firms and their business lines in terms of the type of strategy embeddedness that 
they pursued over time (Table 7). The results show that firms that obtained the highest 
innovation performance were those that pursued pro-active strategy embeddedness (Table 8). 
Specifically, Table 9 shows the results from the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, which 
indicates a positive and significant association between the firms‟ levels of innovation 
performance and the prevailing types of strategy embeddedness that they pursued during the 
period of study: forestry (p<0.05), pulp (p<0.01), and paper (p<0.10). The following section 
provides a qualification to this evidence.  
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Table 7. Evolution of the innovation strategies adopted in specific business lines of the case-study firms 
Firms 1950-1960s 1970-1980s 1990s 2000s 
Forestry Pulp Paper Forestry Pulp Paper Forestry Pulp Paper Forestry Pulp Paper 
Alpha    Pro-active Pro-active  Pro-active Pro-active  Pro-active Pro-active  
Beta    Active Active  Active Active  Active Active  
Gamma        Active Active  Active Active 
Delta Active Active Active Active Active Active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active 
Epsilon   Proactive    Proactive    Reactive   Reactive 
Zeta-A       Reactive  Reactive  Reactive  Reactive  Reactive  Reactive  
Zeta-B      Reactive   Active   Active 
Theta    Pro-active 
 
Active Active Pro-active 
 
Active Active Pro-active 
 
Active Active 
Iota      Reactive   Reactive   Reactive 
Kappa Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Active Active Active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active 
Lambda   Reactive   Reactive   Reactive   Reactive 
Sigma-A    Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active Pro-active 
Sigma-B     Pro-active Pro-active  Pro-active Pro-active  Pro-active Pro-active 
Note: Blank cells mean „not applicable‟ either because (i) the firm and/or the line of business had not started up during that time period or (ii) the firm does not operate that line of business. 
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Table 8.  Types of strategies and levels of innovative performance in specific business lines 
Business lines  Type of strategy 
Level of innovative 
performance (mean) 
Forestry 
Pro-active 3 
Active 2.11 
Pulp 
Pro-active 3.18 
Active 2.23 
Paper 
Pro-active 2.67 
Active 2 
Reactive 1.43 
 
Table 9. Kruskal-Wallis test for firms’ innovation strategies and levels of innovation 
performance 
 
 
       
 
Notes:  (*) Association significant at the 0.10 level;  (**) Association significant at the 0.05 level (***) Association significant at 
the 0.01 level 
 
5.2 Evolution of firms’ innovation performance and strategy embeddedness across 
changing institutional frameworks
14
 
Figure 6 provides a brief representation of the evolution of some of the main changes in the 
macro- and meso-level institutional frameworks over the periods examined in this section.  
 
                                                          
14
 This section does not intend to provide a clear-cut description of the evolution of these three constructs. In some 
parts, the description is blurred.  
  
Innovation strategies vs. innovative performance levels  
Forestry Pulp Paper 
Chi-Square 4.758 6.879 5.917 
df 1 1 2 
p-value 0.029** 0.009*** 0.052* 
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Figure 6. Representation of the evolution of some of the features of the institutional frameworks related to the forestry  
and pulp and paper industries in Brazil  
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5.2.1 The ISI policy regime: the 1950-1960s and 1970-1980s 
5.2.1.1 Main changes in the macro- and meso-level institutional frameworks: 1950-1960s 
Building on the second Vargas‟ government (1951-54), the Kubitschek administration (1956-
60) created the Targets Plan to accelerate Brazil‟s industrialisation process, by intensifying the 
ISI policy. Strong emphasis was given to basic industries and inputs, among them forestry and 
pulp and paper. Under this state-led large-scale industrialisation, the National Bank for 
Economic and Social Development (BNDES)
15
 became not only the main funder of industrial 
projects but also became responsible for Brazil‟s industrial policy. This framework involved 
the creation of state-owned enterprises and agencies to support the development agenda, e.g., 
the National Research Council (CNPq), the Agency for Post-graduate Training (CAPES) and 
later, the Funder of Studies and Projects (FINEP).
16
  
 
Three important factors related to that government agenda, had implications for firms‟ 
expansion of their forestry activities and engagement in innovative activities. First, the 
enforcement of the Forestry Law (of 1966), which provided tax incentives for firms that 
developed planted forestry based on eucalyptus, contributed to the expansion of the forest 
bases needed for new pulp and paper mills. This policy was implemented by the Brazilian 
Institute for Forestry Development (IBDF), created in 1967. To obtain funding from BNDES 
firms had to have their own supply of wood derived from planted forests. 
 
Second, considering that the pulp and paper industries in Brazil emerged spontaneously as a 
response to constraints on import of raw materials (e.g., WW2, Korean War), from the early 
1950s, there was a proliferation of inefficient, small-scale pulp and paper mills. By the late-
1960s, some industrial leaders (some of them from Kappa and Delta), through the Pulp and 
                                                          
15
 Created in 1952 as the BNDE (National Bank for Economic Development), it became Brazil‟s first institution 
dedicated to the long-term funding of infrastructure and industrial development.  
16
 During the 2000s FINEP was upgraded into the Brazilian Innovation Agency.  
32 
 
Paper Manufacturers National Association (ANFPC), provoked the BNDES to assess the 
feasibility of the existing pulp and paper mills in Brazil.
17
 This action reflected the pro-active 
strategy embeddedness of some firms to change industrial policy. Following that study, the 
BNDES and Industrial Development Council imposed new conditions for funding based on the 
increase of scale and of productivity of mills.  
 
Third, the emergence of research facilities and suppliers of human capital proved essential for 
the technological advance of forestry and pulp and paper firms. Supported by CNPq and 
CAPES, the College of Agriculture of the São Paulo University (ESALQ) began to offer 
degree courses in forestry (from undergraduate to PhDs), as it expanded its post-graduate 
programmes and laboratories for pilot production of eucalyptus-based pulp and paper.  
 
5.2.1.2 Firms’ strategy embeddedness and innovation performance: 1950-1960s 
Firms such as Kappa and Delta responded positively to the incentives generated by the 
Forestry Law by expanding their planted forests. However, reflecting a proactive strategy, 
Kappa engaged in research activities. As Brazil lacked proper research facilities, Kappa 
developed a partnership with the Florida University in the US to use its laboratories to test the 
use of eucalyptus for large-scale pulp and paper production. After six years of systematic 
research efforts, by the late 1960s Kappa was manufacturing paper from eucalyptus pulp on a 
large scale.  
 
Similarly, the firm Epsilon, also pursuing a proactive strategy, intensified its innovative efforts 
which had begun in the 1940s: it engaged in research to obtain improved bleached pulp and 
high-performance tissue paper from eucalyptus. However, Brazil‟s weak forestry research 
                                                          
17
 The ANFPC evolved from the National Papermakers Centre, created in 1925 to represent the interests of the 
paper industry among policymakers.   
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capability was a constraint for further innovative activities. Two important strategic actions 
taken by industrial entrepreneurs contributed decisively to overcoming this hurdle. First, firms 
such as Kappa, Delta and Epsilon began to provoke and create research demands for 
government bodies (e.g., IBDF) and government-led education and research institutions 
(ESALQ). This led to the creation, in the mid-1960s, of an external/collective R&D 
arrangement at the Forestry Science and Research Institute (IPEF), funded by the industry, but 
run by the public sector. Such collaboration arrangement permitted these firms to innovate 
successfully and lower the risks involved in this kind of path-creating innovation.
18
  
 
Second, by the mid-1960s, the creation of Alpha by a group of 12 entrepreneurs represented a 
decisive thrust for the commercial success of the eucalyptus-based technological trajectory.
19
 
The initial idea to explore timber evolved into the building of a large export pulp firm. To 
speed up the project, their strategy was to draw on eucalyptus seeds that had been developed 
earlier in Brazil. However, Alpha‟s eucalyptus plantations were marred by uncontrolled 
hybridisation and high variability in growth rates and diseases, reflecting the poor quality of 
seeds. Consequently, Alpha was forced to change its initial strategy and, as early as 1968, 
Alpha structured its own research centre to tackle to such problems. By doing so, Alpha moved 
from vegetative propagation, based on seeds, to tree improvement and clonal programmes 
(Campinhos, 1999; Evans and Turnbull, 2004). Although some shareholders were sceptical 
about such research investments, Alpha‟s dominant group intensified its emphasis on research 
to achieve technological and market leadership.
20
 To facilitate its exports, Alpha negotiated 
with the federal government for permission to build its own harbour next to the mill.  
 
                                                          
18
 I thank one reviewer for suggesting me to refer to this point.  
19
 This group involved visionary Brazilian entrepreneurs, among them one of the creators of Vale, a Brazilian 
mining company and a Norwegian businessman.  
20
 The building of these research capabilities was also found in Scott-Kemmis (1988).  
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5.2.1.3 Main changes in the macro- and meso-level institutional frameworks: 1970-1980s 
While the first National Development Plan (PND-I, 1972-74) focused on infrastructure 
projects, the PND-II (1974-79) emphasised the expansion of basic industries and inputs, among 
them pulp and paper, as a means of increasing exports to face up to the energy crisis. Within 
that framework, a review by BNDES of Brazil‟s forestry and pulp and paper industries led to 
the First National Pulp and Paper Plan, which stimulated forestry research, forest-
manufacturing integration and environment-related innovations. While such measures were 
well received by firms committed to innovative forestry activities (e.g., Alpha, Kappa, Delta), 
some firms responded indifferently or negatively to such measures.  
 
The Second National Pulp and Paper Plan was issued in the late-1980s by a joint efforts 
between the BNDES and the Industrial Development Council with an active participation of 
industrial leaders through the ANFPC, reflecting the pro-active strategy embeddedness of firms 
such as Alpha, Delta, Kappa and Epsilon. It established new targets for the 1990s such as an 
increase of exports and stimuli to initial public offerings (IPOs). The start-up of operations of 
large mills of firms such as Alpha and Beta in the 1970s and of Sigma-A and Sigma-B in the 
1980s, consolidated not only Brazil‟s self-sufficiency in pulp and paper. It also demonstrated a 
successful outcome of the public-private symbiosis and bold efforts of industrial entrepreneurs 
and government to develop and strengthen the eucalyptus-based technology for pulp and paper.  
 
During the early 1980s, there was a change in the division of labour related to the institutional 
framework for forestry research. The state-owned Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural 
Research (EMBRAPA), created in 1973, took up the responsibility for the National 
Programme of Forestry Research, including genetic improvement, while IPEF became 
dedicated to new research methods based on forestry handling and exploitation. Such changes 
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in meso-level institutions with the macro-level weakening of the ISI policy and the severe 
economic crises of the 1980s, led to the discontinuity of the tax incentives for re-forestation 
and of firms‟ collective R&D arrangement for forestry research within ESALQ through IPEF.  
 
5.2.1.4 Firms’ strategy embeddedness and innovation performance: 1970-1980s 
Some firms responded to such discontinuities by creating and/or expanding their internal R&D 
facilities. For example, in addition to its forestry research centre, which had been created in the 
late 1960s, in 1983, Alpha structured an R&D centre dedicated to industrial pulp and paper 
activities. Firms that had started up in the 1980s (e.g., Sigma-A and Sigma-B) and established 
firms (Delta, Beta and Theta) also structured their own forestry research centres. These firms 
began to interact with other local universities (e.g., the Federal University of Lavras (UFL) and 
the Federal University of Viçosa (UFV)). In contrast, other firms (e.g., Lambda and Iota) opted 
to not engage in the creation or strengthening of their own research facilities.  
 
Alpha‟s proactive strategy was reflected in its massive investments in forestry research. In the 
early 1980s Alpha introduced a breakthrough innovation based on mass production of clonally 
propagated planting stock. In 1984, nearly 17 years after having initiated its research activities, 
Alpha achieved worldwide recognition by being awarded the Marcus Wallenberg Prize from 
Sweden.
21
 Alpha‟s achievement of such world-leading innovation consolidated the new 
technological segment opened up by Brazil‟s forestry for pulp and paper firms in the 
international technological frontier.  
 
Building on these achievements, firms such as Alpha, Kappa and Theta sought to reach export 
markets. However, as latecomers, they were confronted with an obvious hurdle: a lack of 
                                                          
21
 Established in 1980 in Sweden, under the Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, this highly respected prize seeks to 
encourage and stimulate path-breaking scientific achievements that contribute significantly to a broadening of 
knowledge and to technical development within fields important to the forestry, pulp and paper industries. 
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international market and technical credibility, especially related to eucalyptus pulp efficacy. To 
overcome this barrier, these firms took actions that reflected, according to the typology of this 
study, typical pro-active strategy embeddedness. They began to build up, re-organise and draw 
on meso-level institutions to help them overcome these hurdles. For example, the Pulp and 
Paper Technical Centre at the University of São Paulo was created to promote the eucalyptus 
fibre in the world market. To strengthen the industry‟s capacity for commercial and political 
lobbying, the Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Association (ANFPC) and the Brazilian 
Association Pulp Exporters were merged into the Brazilian Pulp and Paper Association 
(BRACELPA). The Brazilian Technical Pulp and Paper Association (ABTCP) was 
strengthened to train human resources and to promote manufacturing technical advances.  
 
5.2.2 The transition into an open economy regime: the 1990s period 
5.2.2.1 Main changes in the macro- and meso-level institutional frameworks 
March 1990 marked the formal end of the state-led industrialisation policy in Brazil. In line 
with measures adopted in other developing economies, the Collor administration implemented 
a substantial reduction of trade barriers, an abrupt opening-up of the economy to foreign 
competition with a greater attraction of FDI, de-regulation of the economy and privatisation of 
several state-owned companies. As a result, several firms were swept away from the market, as 
they were unable to face international competition.  
 
The BNDES began to emphasise financial and market mechanisms to allow the Brazilian 
economy to compete globally. To that end, in the early 1990s, BNDES implemented the 
Industrial and Foreign Trade Policy (PICE), which sought to stimulate the development of 
industrial capabilities. This policy sought to disseminate new management and production 
organisation techniques and the creation and upgrading of organisations for manufacturing 
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quality control. In parallel, however, through the mid-1990s, reflecting an exacerbation of neo-
liberal policies, there was a severe financial and institutional weakening of public research 
institutes and universities: EMBRAPA and other organisations had their research programmes 
discontinued.  
 
By the late 1990s, the Cardoso administration (1995-2002) created a set of innovation funds to 
complement the traditional financial resources to support industrial innovation. This set of 
innovation funds generated a new management model for innovation policies in Brazil 
emphasising the modernisation and expansion of the technological infrastructure, the 
promotion of synergies between universities, research institutes and the industry to strengthen 
competitiveness.  
 
5.2.2.2 Firms’ strategy embeddedness and innovation performance  
During the early 1990s, most firms were impacted by the new economic and institutional 
conditions. There were varied types of strategic choices and actions. While some firms 
stumbled, others restructured themselves and/or re-focused. Some sought to survive by 
securing production efficiency with basic innovation capabilities, whereas some firms 
deepened their innovation capabilities, despite the negative impacts on the public research 
facilities caused by the Collor administration.   
 
For example, the papermaker Epsilon, which used to implement innovative strategies from the 
1950s to the 1980s, stopped its innovation efforts during the 1990s, reflecting a reactive 
strategy (Table 7). On the one hand, this was the result of the macro-level imposed 
discontinuity in the policy regime, which suddenly exposed the firm to fierce international 
paper competitors. On the other hand, from the early 1990s, Epsilon also suffered from 
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inconsistencies in its strategies and bad management. By the early 2000s, its innovation 
performance remained stagnant at the intermediate level. By 2009 it was taken over by a 
Chilean firm.  
 
Differently, to overcome its serious financial and commercial difficulties during the early 
1990s, Delta implemented a bold organisational restructuring. This included the elimination of 
some business areas, the introduction of a company-wide quality management programme, the 
re-structuring of its R&D centre, and the achievement of highly recognised international 
certifications (e.g., FSC) in 2000.
22
 In contrast, Theta‟s strategic options emphasised 
innovation- capability deepening of the forestry business rather than pulp and even less paper 
(Table 7).
23
 
 
Firms such as Lambda, Iota and Zeta-A pursued reactive strategies to guarantee their minimum 
competitive performance, under the new economic and institutional environment. Their efforts 
focused on strengthening production capabilities and basic/intermediate innovation 
performance. In contrast, firms such as Alpha, Sigma-A and Sigma-B sought to deepen their 
innovation capabilities, especially their organisational dimension. For example, Alpha 
restructured its research activities by merging the forestry and the industrial R&D centres. By 
so doing, it sought to augment its forestry research capabilities (e.g., development of clonal 
forests and new genetic material) in association with pulp and papermaking research (e.g., 
research on lignin biosynthesis and the patenting of the totally chlorine-free pulp (TFC) 
process and pollution control methods based on natural micro-organisms). Firms such as Alpha 
and Sigma-A created teams in their research centres and other units to discuss innovation 
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 Created in 1993,  the Forest Stewardship Council certifies forestry firms based on socio-environmental criteria: 
www.fsc.org 
23
 Consequently, Theta‟s innovation performance in pulp and paper (Table 6) should be interpreted as the result of 
a strategic option rather than failure. 
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projects with large paper customers. Sigma-A implemented the „Re-think Project‟ to encourage 
people to criticise existing routines and procedures to integrate different knowledge bases to 
speed up innovation. 
 
5.2.3 The open economy and globalised competition regime: the period 2000s 
5.2.3.1 Main changes in the macro- and meso-level institutional frameworks  
The Lula administration (2003-10) sought to re-establish the role of government policy in 
Brazil‟s industrial development. BNDES focused its support on expansions, mergers and 
internationalisation of large national firms – including forestry, pulp and paper – reflecting a 
„picking-winners‟ kind of approach.24 Industrial policy was based on a narrow selection of 
sectors.  For example, the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE) was 
issued in 2004, and the Productive Development Plan (PDP) expanded its coverage to 24 
sectors in 2007, targeting the strengthening of the international competitiveness of the pulp and 
paper industries. The Lula administration strengthened the innovation funds created during the 
Cardoso government. It went further to implement new policy instruments to promote 
innovation within firms and their links with universities and research institutes based on 
funding and fiscal incentives (e.g., the Innovation Law (2004) and the Good Law (2005).
25
  
 
5.2.3.2 Firms’ strategy embeddedness and innovation performance 
The innovative activities of the case firms, especially those with active and pro-active strategy 
embeddedness, were characterised by the following: (i) strengthening of their research 
activities, internally and in partnership with universities and research institutes; and (ii) 
                                                          
24
 The fact that Alpha and Sigma-A were able to persuade BNDES to fund their merger in 2009 as a response to 
the global financial crisis, is in itself evidence of a public-private symbiosis between BNDES and the pro-active 
forestry and pulp and paper firms in Brazil since the 1950s. That merger created the world‟s largest eucapulp firm.  
25
 These are, respectively, Law 10,973 of December 2004 and Law 11,196 of November 2005.  
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diversification into new business lines based on the previously accumulated innovation 
capabilities, especially in forestry. 
 
In terms of research activities, some firms sought to re-organise their research centres on the 
basis of more specialised and commercially oriented activities to sustain their innovation 
performance. They also realised the importance of partnerships to achieve this goal. For 
example, in 2002, Sigma-A and Sigma-B merged their R&D units into the Centre for Pulp 
Technological Development to accelerate the achievement of research outcomes. In 2005, this 
unit designed software based on a complex set of equations, to calculate the economic value of 
a clone, allowing the firm to choose the best clone for specific sites. In 2002, papermaker Delta 
reviewed and re-organised its research centre to not only deepen its research into new genetic 
material but also to improve product and process development activities. Kappa, on the other 
hand, regained its innovation drive in 2006, after a period of unfocused strategy during the 
1990s due to internal management problems. Its new top management emphasised research-
based innovation, especially in forestry, as a key driver for Kappa‟s international leadership.    
 
One of the remarkable public-private research initiatives of that period was the emergence of 
the Genolyptus Project – Brazilian Network of Eucalyptus Genomics Research (2002-2008). 
Sponsored by one of the innovation funds from the Ministry of Science and Technology, this 
large research project involved 13 firms (among them Alpha, Kappa, Beta, Gamma, Delta, 
Theta, Sigma-A and Sigma-B) and seven universities, under the coordination of the 
government enterprise EMBRAPA. Genolyptus gathered a large amount of genomic 
information to further the understanding of the underlying variation of genes. One of its 
novelties was a focus on wood and disease resistance and its implications for innovation and 
productivity increases and the international competitiveness of Brazil‟s pulp and paper 
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industries (Grattapaglia, 2004; Grattapaglia and Kirst, 2008). Through this successful project, 
Brazil became one of the few countries to undertake cutting-edge eucalyptus genomic research 
based on a nation-wide biotechnology network.
26
  
 
The end of Genolyptus, in 2008, somehow forced the participating firms to make strategic 
choices about further forestry activities. For example, Alpha, Kappa, Delta, Sigma-A and 
Sigma-B built on the advances obtained from their participation in Genolyptus to intensify 
their interactions with world-leading research networks in Australia, Canada, Sweden, 
Germany, and USA. In 2009, Kappa supplied a eucalyptus gene to be used in a world-leading 
genomic research project led by a pool of leading research institutes. Alpha also implemented 
an intellectual property policy to intensify patenting. However, firms such as Beta and Theta 
pursued less ambitious steps after Genolyptus.  
 
In addition, some firms sought to draw on their accumulated innovation capabilities, especially 
in forestry, to diversify into new business lines. For example, in 2009, following a review of its 
strategic goals, Kappa opened a business line on renewable energy through the production of 
wood pallets for export markets.
27
 Subsequently, Kappa acquired a British biotechnology firm 
with operations in the US, Israel, China and Southeast Asia. This was designed to facilitate the 
firm‟s entry into biofuels and the commercialisation of modified genes and to support its 
internationalisation strategy. By the time of fieldwork, firms Alpha, Kappa and Sigma-A and 
                                                          
26 A previous initiative (2001-04) was the creation of an expressed sequence tag (EST) database through the 
ForEST project (Eucalyptus Genome Sequencing Project Consortium), funded by the Research Foundation of the 
State of São (FAPESP) involving firms such as Sigma-A, Sigma-B and Kappa.   
27
 These are dehydrated and pressed particles of ground wood that are one of the most efficient methods of 
transporting biomass for energy over long distances.  
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Sigma-B were advancing projects to move into biorefineries to generate fuels, power, heat, and 
value-added chemicals from biomass.
28
  
 
6. Discussions of Findings  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between micro-level innovation 
performance and changing institutional frameworks and the mediating role of strategy 
embeddedness. This set of relationships was examined based on longitudinal and first-hand 
evidence from natural-resource-processing firms, forestry and pulp and paper in Brazil (1950-
2009). In contrast to most existing studies, this paper has proxied innovation performance 
using the concept of capabilities „levels‟. To examine the mediating role of strategy in the 
relationship between firms‟ innovation performance and institutions, the paper advanced the 
concept with „capability-building strategy embeddedness‟. It was operationalised in terms of 
levels of interactions between the firms‟ innovation strategy process with components and 
players of their institutional frameworks over time, ranging from pro-active to active to 
reactive. The paper‟s main findings are discussed below.  
 
6.1 Variability across firms in terms of innovation performance across changing 
institutional frameworks  
In relation to the first question, on the extent to which the case firms differed in terms of the 
manner and speed at which they achieved innovation performance across changing institutional 
frameworks during the 1950-2009 period, the study reveals the following findings. First, since 
the 1950s, firms have been engaged in a technological pathway that involved a qualitative 
departure from the established technological trajectory at an early stage in the capability 
development of Brazil‟s forestry and pulp and paper industry. This permitted the main 
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 In several interviews managers defined these firms as „forestry firms‟. They pointed out that pulp and paper are 
no longer their only businesses.  
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Brazilian firms to overtake global technological leaders and to compete on even terms with 
them in world markets. Second, as these firms moved along that technological pathway, they 
also moved through different institutional frameworks, involving hurdles and discontinuities 
but also opportunities: raw material scarcity and import restrictions (1950s);  incentives (e.g., 
government policies of the ISI period and the open economy phase since the 1990s); 
challenging discontinuities (interruption of large research projects led by public sector 
institutions in the late-1980s), pressure for strategic choices on internal research (e.g., end of 
Genolyptus in 2008) and abrupt macro-level disruptions (major break in the policy regime 
during the early 1990s).  
 
Third, as shown in Section 5, there was a high degree of variation across the firms (and 
business lines) in terms of the manner and dynamics in which they achieved levels of 
innovation performance along this new technological pathway and across those changing 
institutional frameworks. Some achieved world-leading innovation at a relatively fast pace 
(e.g., Alpha, Sigma-A, Sigma-B), others achieved that innovation performance level less 
rapidly (e.g., Delta, Kappa). In comparison, other firms achieved „follower-type‟ of innovation 
performance level (e.g., Beta Gamma-pulp) or reached levels that were halfway back the 
innovation frontier (e.g., Zeta-A, Theta-pulp). Others had their innovation trajectories 
interrupted and even reversed (e.g., Epsilon). In sum, there was high degree of variability in the 
manner and speed at which they achieved their innovation performance, involving qualitative 
transformations, truncations and reversals. Additionally, the innovation performance achieved 
by firms such as Alpha, Kappa, Delta and Sigma-A have permitted them to engage in the 
diversification (although still incipient) of their business lines. By doing so, they are in a better 
position than other case firms to sustain their corporate growth (Amsden and Hikino, 1994) and 
meeting the current challenge diversification (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006).  
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Fourth, by drawing on a micro-level design and on longitudinal fieldwork analysis, this study 
captures a dynamic, in-depth, nuanced and comprehensive view of the industrial reality, which 
is not usually captured in studies based on highly aggregated designs. Consequently, the 
findings herein do not provide support for the views held in studies such as Ocampo (2001), 
Cimoli and Katz (2003), Cimoli and Correa (2005) and, especially, Castaldi et al. (2009) 
relative to the nature of the „specialisation patterns‟ taken by Latin American economies after 
the reforms of the 1990s. Such statement deserves some qualifications.  
 
First, obviously, this paper does not suggest any simplistic or radically opposing view that the 
reforms of the 1990s did not have negative impacts on the industrial innovation capability 
building in Brazil. Nor does the paper suggest that natural resource-processing industries, and 
especially the firms studied herein, are all characterised by high-level innovation capabilities. 
Second, at least in the context of this study, the findings indicate that the technological 
behaviour of the main firms of these highly relevant industries studied herein was characterised 
by a long-term process of building, accumulation, re-organisation (during the 1990s), 
renewing, deepening and diversification (although still incipient) of their innovation 
capabilities. Such process was associated with progressively higher levels of innovative 
performance and the achievement of leading commercial and technological positions in the 
global marketplace. Third, the variability in micro-level innovation performance found across 
the case firms as well as the world-leading innovation achievements attained by some of them 
are, in themselves, evidence that natural resource-processing industries are not the sort of 
industry to be encapsulated in one single category characterised by „low knowledge content‟ 
and „absence of technological learning‟, as suggested in Castaldi et al. (2009).  
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6.2 Role of strategy embeddedness in mediating the interaction between firms’ innovation 
performance and changing institutional frameworks 
In light of the theoretical framework that was developed here, the study found that these firms 
pursued different levels of strategy embeddedness over time. Some firms pursued pro-active 
strategies (Alpha, Sigma-A, Sigma-B, Kappa and Delta), while others took active strategies 
(Gamma and Zeta-B), whereas others pursued arm‟s length strategies (Lambda and Zeta-A). 
Some began with pro-active strategies that ended up reactive (Epsilon), while others 
experienced a period of relative activeness during the 1990s (Kappa) but moved into pro-active 
strategy making during the 2000s. There were also variations across business lines of the same 
firm such as at Theta (active in pulp and paper and proactive in forestry).  
 
The results suggest that variability in the firms‟ innovation performance across changing 
institutional frameworks was mediated by degrees of strategy embeddedness. Specifically, the 
following was determined for firms that pursued proactive strategy embeddedness: (i) their 
innovation performance was significantly higher over time than firms that pursed proactive 
embeddedness; (ii) they faced whatever discontinuities with progressively higher levels of 
innovation performance than firms that pursued active or reactive strategy embeddedness; (iii) 
they sought to shape their institutional frameworks to overcome hurdles inherent to their 
latecomer condition and negotiate their transitions into world-leading technological and 
commercial positions. Thus, proactiveness in strategy embeddedness seems to provide a kind 
of buffer to possible deleterious effects of changing institutional frameworks on firms‟ 
innovation performance. Additionally, firms pursuing pro-active strategies were more capable 
of identifying and taking advantage of technological and market opportunities than firms that 
relied on active and reactive types of strategy embeddedness.  
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These findings help to overcome some of the shortcomings of existing studies relative to the 
role of micro-level factors other than learning in explaining variability across latecomer firms 
in terms of innovation performance. Indeed, this study‟s rich findings about the role of strategy 
embeddedness in mediating the relationship between micro-level innovation performance and 
changes in macro- and meso-level institutional frameworks throw fresh empirical content into 
the debate and analysis of catch-up and industrial leadership of latecomer firms. While the 
study advances the kind of empirical analysis undertaken in notable previous research (e.g., 
Evans, 1995; Murmann, 2003), it also contributes to shedding light on contradictory 
conclusions (e.g., Jung and Lee, 2010; Iacovone and Crespi, 2010). Again, this kind of 
longitudinal micro-level perspective is not captured by studies based on macro-level design and 
data derived from aggregated types of data (either country-level data or data derived from 
innovation surveys). Thus, the findings here add empirical texture and provide a nuanced and 
more realistic perspective on the intricate process of innovation-capability building in 
latecomer firms, especially in under-researched natural resource-processing industries.   
 
The findings nonetheless provide support for studies that emphasise the role of institutional 
frameworks in industrial innovation in developing economies (Rodrik, 2004, 2006; Cimoli et 
al., 2009; Nelson, 1996; Nelson and Sampat, 2001; Iacavone and Crespi, 2010). However, the 
study herein goes further by demonstrating that although well-designed institutional 
frameworks are obviously necessary for the achievement of industrial innovation and 
leadership, a large part of achieving them will depend on the nature and dynamics of the firm‟s 
own strategic choices and related innovation efforts. Although this appears to be well known, 
the role of micro-level innovation efforts seems the ignored or underestimated in the design 
and implementation of industrial innovation policies.  
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7. Concluding Discussions  
7.1 Contributions for theory and policy 
7.1.1 Contribution for theory   
Despite the emergence of Lall‟s framework circa 20 years ago, this research field has not made 
substantial advances in terms of explanatory factors relative to innovation performance of 
latecomer firms. By drawing on insights from the literatures on innovation, strategic 
management and institutions, this study has developed a conceptual framework centred on 
capability-building strategy embeddedness. By applying this framework empirically, this paper 
contributes to advancing theory on the variability in innovation performance across latecomer 
firms. The paper also creates a basis for deepening the analysis of the dynamic interaction 
between micro- and meso/macro-level factors and its implications for innovation performance 
improvement in latecomer firms, especially those that operate in natural resource-rich 
economies.  
 
7.1.2 Implications for policy  
Policymakers seeking to improve industrial innovation performance should consider, first, that 
far from adapting automatically to given contingencies in their environment, firms can pursue 
their own strategic choices related to their technological development paths. Consequently, 
their responses to given policy frameworks will vary. Second, policymakers should not take a 
one-way perspective on policymaking, i.e., simply designing and supplying components of 
institutional frameworks (policies, incentives, laws and rules) for the industry. Third, corporate 
managers can offer precious insights and inputs to improve institutional frameworks to 
promote and support industrial innovation. Policymakers should take their contributions more 
seriously and seek to coordinate policymaking processes with the strategic needs and choices 
related to innovation efforts of firms and their partners.  
48 
 
 
Fourth, one of the mechanisms for such coordination would be the building of targets for 
innovation performance based on the achievement of progressively higher levels of innovative 
performance. However, such targeting should not only focus on the sustaining of innovation 
performance of firms and industries along existing technological trajectories. They should also 
target the achievement of progressively higher levels of innovative performance at the level of 
industries and firms along new technological segments whether or not they are derived from 
existing technological trajectories.  
 
7.2 Limitations and future research suggestions  
This study has a number of limitations. It does not examine how the learning processes would 
interact with strategy embeddedness to mediate variability in firms‟ innovation performance 
within changing institutional frameworks. Nor does the paper captures the outcomes of firms‟ 
innovative performance. Future research might address these issues. This paper offers a powerful 
framework to scrutinise the manner, nuances and dynamics of firms‟ innovation performance. 
Such an approach might represent a powerful supplementary analysis to studies of firms‟ 
innovative performance that are based on innovation surveys and analysis of panel data. 
Furthermore, the framework for strategy embeddedness can be applied together with other 
micro-level factors (e.g., leadership and corporate behaviour) to examine their role in firms‟ 
innovation performance.  
 
The research questions, theoretical framework and proxies can be examined using hypothesis 
testing in a large sample. This may yield more robust explanations of the dynamics of latecomer 
firms‟ innovation performance. Additionally, by drawing on the methodological contributions of 
this paper, in terms of proxies for innovative performance and strategy embeddedness, future 
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research might examine those issues in other types of natural resources and natural resource-
processing industries and undertake cross-sector and even cross-country analyses. Future 
research might also examine triggers and mechanisms to achieve strategy embeddedness. Finally, 
future research might draw on this and other related studies to create a typology to distinguish 
among different kinds of innovative activities in natural resource-related industries.  
 
7.3 Conclusion  
This paper contributes to improving our understanding of variability in innovation performance 
across latecomer firms, especially in natural resource-processing industries. It does so by 
examining the dynamics of micro-level innovation performance improvement across changing 
meso/macro institutional frameworks and the mediating role of the strategy embededness over 
time. Although macro- and meso-level institutional frameworks are relevant for industrial 
growth, innovation and competitiveness, these will largely depend on the nature and dynamics 
of micro-level strategy processes related to innovation capability building.  
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